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THE SEMANTICS OF MODAL CONSTRUCTIONS

BY TENNEY FRANK

I. NON HABET QUOD DET

The recent activity in syntactical study of languages, ancient and modern, has been unusually suggestive as to methods, though perhaps not so fruitful in actual results. The emphasis laid upon psychological forces and the application of the methods of comparative grammar, the adoption of hints from the sciences of morphology and semantics, the continued patient devotion of a few to the historical grouping of large masses of material, have all contributed much toward creating a hope that chaos contains the possibility of order even in this field. However, the enthusiastic devotion to a single theory that is wont to assert itself in discoverers has often resulted in the overemphasis of partial methods, and has perhaps needlessly postponed a desired synthesis of methods that might bring more abiding results. Furthermore, in modal syntax, with which we are here concerned, the intricacies of the problems presented by the more complex sentences have intimidated many students into confining their researches within the simple sentence. Many of those who have essayed the harder problems of hypotaxis have been satisfied to explain the enigmas of the complex group by a too ingenuous reference to the behavior of the simple ones, not realizing that the compound of two or more simples even in language is often a wholly new entity, not a mere sum of the original forces. It was with this general situation in view that the present studies¹ were undertaken.

I believe that what is most needed at present is a number of life-history studies of phrases, clauses, and idiomatic constructions, just as the larger problems of biological evolution need a great number of life-histories. Such must not only be descriptive in nature, but, to be of the greatest service, must also connect the individual with its cognates in the general scheme of evolution.

¹A second paper will follow, devoted to expressions like *nulla causa est quin det*.
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The complete story of a highly specialized idiom like this involves three tasks. (1) The idiom must be described as it behaves in the language studied. (2) Its grammatical relationships within its own language must be examined for light upon its immediate provenance. Here care must be observed to search for such forces in its context as may have created, fixed, and preserved the idiom within the language. (3) Cognate constructions in the closely related languages must always be scrutinized lest we explain as of Latin origin a construction that is due to circumstances not existing in Latin. I hope that the paper will not only furnish data in regard to the idioms here studied, but will give some definite proof as to the limits of applicability of the methods now generally used, as well as offer some new suggestions for future work.

I. Expressions like (*non*) *habet quod det*, with potential force, are of frequent occurrence throughout Latin. In Plautus they appear nearly a hundred times; in Cicero the number exceeds this; and they continue to be familiar throughout Latin literature with little change in form or function. The relative clauses contained in them are sometimes grouped in the grammars with so-called consecutive or characterizing clauses. They are like these in that they qualify an indefinite or negative antecedent of the same kind. They differ from them, however, in that they are invariably in the subjunctive mood, whereas ordinary characterizing clauses may at times be found in the indicative, particularly in early Latin and in the poets. Secondly, the character that they express as a consequence of the nature of the antecedent is not expressed as an existing fact, but rather as possible. *nihil est quod det* in this idiom means, "he has nothing that he can give," "he has not the means." The idiom is usually a mere statement of existence or non-existence of some means not further defined, but the nature of which is made evident in the relative clause that follows. (*non*) *est*, (*non*) *habet*, (*non*) *copiast*, (*non*) *paratumst*, are the antecedents in a large majority of the occurrences; often, however, a semi-defining noun stands as antecedent, as in *nil est dotis quod*. In the most characteristic phrases the negative antecedent is somewhat more frequent than the affirmative.

The most striking peculiarity is one that I do not think has been pointed out. The relative clause in the group *nil est quod det* (except in a limited class of instances) changes its function materially with the change of case in *quod*:

1. When *quod* is the subject of *det*, the clause expresses a fact: "there is nothing that gives, etc."

2. When *quod* is used adverbially, the clause expresses an "obligation": "There is no reason why he should give."

3. When *quod* is the direct object of *det*, the clause is "potential in force": "There is nothing he can give."

We are here concerned with the third type. The second type will be taken up in the next study.

Some data will make the matter clearer. Of the relative¹ clauses in Plautus that express capacity or "potentiality" in modal idioms, almost all use the relative as the direct object of the subordinate clause. In this function *quod* occurs more than forty times; *quem*, *quos*, etc., ten times. Finally the dative and ablative objects appear a few times. This is not saying that the relative never serves as direct object in pure characterizing clauses of fact. It may do so when the action of its verb is not purely momentary and physical in the present time. This exception holds true of most verbs whose action covers more than the immediate present; cf. *nil est quin dixerim* (*Bacch.* 1012), "There is nothing that I have not told him;" of general truths; cf. *quisnam fluviust quem non recipiat mare* (*Cure.* 86); also verbs denoting mental activity and therefore coming under the same rule; cf. *nullast quam aequè amem* (*Am.* 509), "There's no girl I love so much," ". . . quem metuum" (*As.* 111); ". . . quod cupiam" (*Cure.* 172), etc. All of these express actuality, not potentiality. Now contrast these with *nil habet quod det*, . . . *faciat*. . . *videam*, . . . *edim*, etc. The latter do not express actuality. They convey an additional idea, namely, that of *posse*.

This distinction seems so intricate that it will probably be suspected by the grammarians who fear "metaphysical syntax," but it is not a distinction of Latin alone. It holds true in general for other languages also; for it denotes a limitation of thought,

¹ I omit for the time being clauses with *unde*, *ubi*, *qui*-instrumental, and the like.

and therefore naturally of expression. In English we may say, "There is no one here that I love, . . . hate; . . . that I wish to see, . . . that I have ever seen, . . . that I (ever) associate with." "There is nothing here that I wish to eat, . . . can eat," etc. But we do not—never have reason to—say in a literal sense: "There is nothing here that I eat" (in the sense of "am eating"), ". . . that I see, strike, touch." Nor do other languages use such phrases. The following expressions would hardly be intelligible, except perhaps in some figurative sense: *Es ist keiner hier, den ich sehe*; *Il n'y a personne ici que je voie*; *Det finnes ingen her, som jag ser*, etc.

Now, the remarkable fact about the behavior of Latin in the use of this idiom is that, while in other languages we neither express nor possess any idiomatic collocation that might express such a notion, Latin has such a collocation which, taken at face-value, as we understand such values in the Latin we possess, would express that piece of *ἀδύνατα εἰκότα*, which, however, expresses something quite different, i. e., capacity. The phrase *nīl habet quod det*, with *quod* as an accusative, could therefore never have been in its present form a pure characterizing clause of fact, as is the case with the nominative *quod*. It may have been an extension of such, adapted to a new function. It may, as I shall suggest, be connected with a relative clause of purpose, or it may have come more directly from independent uses of the subjunctive after *quod* had acquired the power of subordination.

As for the current method of classifying such clauses, it is usual to include them under the consecutive relative clauses without explanation. Mr. Hale¹ believes that they come from an independent "potential." Mr. Elmer² thinks that they must either be grouped with volitives or with what he terms the subjunctive of contingent futurity. Such attributions imply certain life-histories, even if these are not given in full. The truth may be that several usages are here included in one group. Whatever the past history may have been, I believe that the expressions described above made up a fairly homogeneous group by the time

¹ Cf. *Cum-Constructions*, pp. 106, 107; *Trans. A. P. A.* 1900, pp. 160 ff.; Hale-Buck *Grammar*, sec. 516.

² *Cornell Studies* VI, p. 196.

of Plautus, and acting together as a definite *Gebrauchstypus*, and that we are doing no violence to the correct conception of language in studying them as one consistent group.

The idiom is fairly stable throughout Latinity. Some later divergencies are noticeable, however. Cicero, while showing no aversion to the idiom, is fond of substituting for it a more explicit expression of capacity; i. e., a characterizing clause whose verb is some subjunctive form of *possum* or *queo*, as for example, *habere se putant quod . . . queant dicere* (*Lael.* 71; cf. *Off.* 2. 39; *Div. Caec.* 10; *Caecin.* 36, etc.). This habit is no doubt in accord with the equally redundant habit of ending an implied quotation of a reason with a verb declarandi; e. g., *egit quod aequum esse diceret*.

The fact is obvious that the subjunctive was assuming an ever-increasing burden of work, and was becoming so overloaded that an exact writer must unconsciously have used such means for the sake of clearness.

Another novelty is the appearance of *nil habet quid det*, if in fact its non-appearance in Plautus is not to be attributed to a Plautine or colloquial peculiarity. It seems to be a relatively late outgrowth of a semantic change in *habeo*, which verb in this new idiom becomes almost a synonym of *scio*. Plautus has *nil habeo certi quid loquar* (*Mil.* 407), and Terence uses the phrase once in a dependent but "extended" deliberative of the first person: *Andr.* 498, *teneo quid erret et quid agam habeo*. By the time of Cicero the new idiom is frequent. Considering that this use of *habeo* is highly specialized and late, we cannot bring forth *habeo quid* as an explanation of *habeo quod*. It is more probable that the influence worked in the opposite direction. It is also probable that the Greek οὐχ ἔχω ὅτι played a considerable part in the creation of (*non*) *habeo quid*. I do not mean to imply that these two expressions were ever perfectly synonymous, but they certainly overlap in function at times.

There is finally an interesting example of "contamination" in the late Latin idiom *non habuit quod (quid) dicere*, which is obviously due to a fusion of *non habuit quod (quid) diceret* and *nihil habuit dicere*. Cf. *Je n'ai que faire de lui*.

I have considered it worth while to give a full list of the Plautine examples to show the early usage of the idiom. For later authors abundant examples may be found in the lexicons. We have not space for them here. I have grouped them according to the nature of the antecedents and connectives, and have separated the affirmatives from the negatives. Such as depend upon other subjunctives and infinitives of indirect discourse are inclosed in brackets.

1. *est quod*, *-unde*, *-qui*, etc.:

est domi quod edimus (*Poen.* 537); *erit* extemplo mihi *quod* dem tibi (*Capt.* 122); *doleat* (*Cist.* 67); *miserescat* (*Ep.* 526); *des* (*Men.* 492); *dicas* (*Merc.* 642); *gaudeant* (*St.* 394); (ut *quod* abrodat *sit* [*Am.* 724]; *det* [*As.* 83]; *edis* [*Poen.* 867]).

sunt divitiae? *unde* excoquat sebum (*Capt.* 281); *occipiam* (*M. G.* 676).

est qui ventrem vestiam (*St.* 376); (*qui* conteram [*As.* 419]; *possis* [*Trin.* 653]).

est ubi ambules (*Capt.* 12); (ut *sit ubi* sedeat [*M. G.* 82]; *essem* [*Truc.* 140]; *quem* caederes [*Am.* 377]).

a) Negatives of the same class:

non est quod dem (*Capt.* 121; *As.* 242; *Trin.* 761); (*nega esse quod* dem [*St.* 256]; *darem* [*Pers.* 119]; *det* [*Cist.* 737]).

nil est quod respondeam (*Trin.* 188); *dem* (*Aul.* 238); *perdam* (*Men.* 665).

nil est qui tergum tegam (*Most.* 992); *dimminuam* (*Men.* 304); *fungatur* (*Trin.* 354); *vivamus* (*Trin.* 561); *quo* recipiam (*Capt.* 103); *quicum* litigent (*Poen.* 587); *qua* possit (*M. G.* 329).

non ubi sedeas *locus est* (*Capt.* 12); (*ubi* possit [*As.* 767]).

unde dent (*Truc.* 146); *quos* emerem (*Pers.* 262); *quibuscum* haberes (*Bacch.* 564); *nec tibi qui* vivas *domist* (*Capt.* 581); *qui* ulciscerer (*Men.* 636).

quod dem *nusquam* *est* (*As.* 631); *queat* (*Trin.* 801).

nullus est tibi quem roges? (*Ps.* 294); *qui* reddatur (*Bacch.* 609) (= *quem* reddat); *qui* negem (*Capt.* 937); *despondeam* (*Merc.* 614); *procurent* (*St.* 200).

2. Other verbs of existence; *habeo*, *copias*, *paratumst*, etc.:

habet quod det (*Poen.* 833); *dent* (*Truc.* 76); *ut habeat quod* det (*As.* 103); *des* (*As.* 188); *renumeret* (*Bacch.* 46); *feram* (*Trin.* 728); *quod* ames *paratumst* (*Bacch.* 219); *edit* (*Poen.* 9); *quod* ames *praestost* (*Ep.* 653); *agat* (*M. G.* 205); *copias* *qui* solvas (*Rud.* 558); *habeo*

unde dem (*As.* 234; *Trin.* 158); *expetam* (*Cist.* 671); *qui* utamur (*Trin.* 335, 336); (*qui* possent [*Ep.* 384]).

a) Negatives of the same class:

quod edit *non* habet (*Capt.* 463; *Trin.* 564; *Truc.* 243 [*Truc.* 242]).

neque id *unde* efficiat habet (*Poen.* 185); occipias (*Ps.* 399); *ubi* collocem (*Ep.* 531); (*non habere quoi* commendarem [*Merc.* 246]; *quo* intromittar [*Men.* 669]; *qui* nosceret [*Rud.* 393]; *qui* aleret [*Trin.* 14]).

3. Similar expressions conveying a potential idea may follow verbs of action like *dare*, *quaerere*, etc. A volitive idea is always evident in these expressions, especially when the leading verb is an imperative (or subjunctive of will). Sometimes the volitive idea is the predominant one. Their relationship with the preceding classes will be discussed later.

dat *quod* edit (*Trin.* 359); *raro* *dabat* *quod* biberem (*Cist.* 19); *qui* occideret (*Trin.* 129).

da illi *quod* bibat (*Most.* 344); dem (*M. G.* 692); *monstra* *quod* bibam (*Men.* 742).

da . . . *ubi* condormiscam (*Rud.* 571); *ubi* ames (*Poen.* 603; *Curc.* 311; *St.* 752; *Aul.* 407).

quod edit *quaerit* (*Capt.* 461); *quaero* hospitium *ubi* curer (*Poen.* 693).

dum illi *quod* edit . . . *praebeas* (*Men.* 90).

ratu's *nactum* hominem *quem* defraudares (*Rud.* 1387; *Bacch.* 506, 864).

vix reliquit deo *quod* loqueretur (*Cist.* 150; cf. *As.* 233; *Aul.* 14; *Cas.* 251; *Curc.* 388).

eme lanam *unde* tibi pallium conficiatur (*M. G.* 687; cf. also *Aul.* 672; *Bacch.* 233; *Merc.* 53; *M. G.* 768; *Poen.* 178, 668; *Trin.* 558).

Some negatives of the same nature are: *nec* *quod* edim quicquam datur (*Poen.* 1284); *quem* rogitem (*Rud.* 226; *Trin.* 135, 155).

There is also a peculiar instance with *illud quod*: "*blanditur dum illud quod rapiat videt* (*Men.* 193). It is usually believed that *ille* has not yet assumed the characterizing function in Plautus. Perhaps this is an early instance. The clause is certainly not one of "volition." The meaning of *videt* precludes that interpretation.

II. We have seen that Latin literature exhibits our idiom as well established and almost unchanging. Yet it bears the appear-

ance of being highly specialized. Latin possesses verbs and collocations of words with which to express capacity and possibility. Why should our elliptical expression with its verb invariably in the subjunctive have invaded this field?

A scrutiny of the material given above, and a comparison of this with similar but more primitive constructions, may give some hints as to its immediate provenance. Its most stable element is the mood of the dependent clause. On the basis of this the comparison should be made.

1. There is a close resemblance between this and relative clauses of purpose. Purpose expressions readily fall into expressions of character and capacity. When one says: "I shall hire a man to do this," his words leave the implication that he will try to get a man who *can* do it. Language constantly reveals phrases that betray this habit of our thought processes. English has frankly adopted an auxiliary of capacity for many of its purpose expressions ("that *may*," "in order that *may*"). Even the English infinitive, which is largely a dative of purpose, often expresses not purpose but availability: "Water, water everywhere, nor any drop *to drink*." Greek did not hesitate to express a purpose clause in the optative with *ἄν* or *κεν* which is the mechanism most frequent with the various "potential" idioms. Cf. *Od.* viii. 21:

καί μιν μακρότερον καὶ πάσσονα θῆκεν ιδέσθαι
ὥς κεν Φαίηκεσσι φίλος πάντεσσι γένοιτο.

See also v. 166. What is even more surprising, the mechanism is found in a relative clause after a primary tense in *Il.* i. 64,

ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ τινα μάντιν ἐρείομεν ὅς κ' εἴποι.

Now, returning to Latin, note in the following series the gradual submission of the note of *will* to that of *capacity*:

a) *ut commostremus* locum ubi potes, "to show you a place where you may drink" (*Poen.* 603).

quo furatum venias *vestigas loca* (*Rud.* 111).

b) *quaerit* quod edit (*Capt.* 461).

da illi quod bibat (*Most.* 344).

c) *paratumst* quod edit (*Poen.* 9).

nec quod edit *quicquam datur* (*Poen.* 1284).

- d) est domi quod edimus (Poen. 537).
nec tibi qui vivas domist (Capt. 581).*

The same change may be observed after the leading verb *relinquere* in the following:

- a) relinque aliquantum orationis cras quod mecum litiges (Cas. 251).
b) satin vix reliquit deo quod loqueretur loci (Cist. 150).
c) agri reliquit non magnum modum quo . . . viveret (Aul. 14).
d) non omnino iam perii; est relicuom quo peream magis (As. 233).
e) qui me aleret nil video esse reliqui (Trin. 14).*

If the first sentence had been introduced by *est relicuom* (practically equal to *est* or *habet*) instead of by the imperative, which gives a tone of intention to the whole, we should have found a strong potential tone present. In other words, in proportion as intention shades off from the leading verb, and as the leading verb changes into the tense and voice that make it a mere expression of the existence or non-existence of an effective agent, the relative clause shifts from the tone of a purpose into that of a "potential" expression.

Observe again that with a leading verb expressing volition by means of an imperative or subjunctive, the dependent verb even in this form has a predominantly volitive shading; e. g., *Am. 724, "ut quod abrodat sit," As. 105, "ut habeat filius amicae quod det;"* and several others in the list. In fact, in such situations Plautus often finds it necessary to rescue the potential idea from being thus overwhelmed by the volitive of the main verb. This he does by means of the verb *posse*, which is not otherwise necessary. Cf. *Trin. 653, ut tibi sit qui te corrigere possis*. In a statement of fact he would probably have written *est qui corrigas*. Other good instances are *As. 767; Epid. 384; Merc. 53; Trin. 155*. This again betrays the very close connection between the two idioms.

I would add an illustration of a slightly different type. Compare "*aliquid quod poscas paras,*" *As. 168*, with "*quod ames paratumst,*" *Bacch. 219*. In the former an active verb, energetic with intention, fills the dependent clause with purpose. In the latter the verb is passive; the end has been attained, the means secured. Now, means implies capacity, the expression of which becomes predominant in the dependent clause. Other expressions

like the second one are: *Rud.* 558, "*tibi copias*. . . . *qui rem solvas*;" *Epid.* 653, "*tibi quod ames domi praestest opera mea*." (Note how the words *opera mea* keep a reminder of effort, i. e., of a purpose expression, still lingering in the sentence.)

To an intelligent mind, even the words *copia*, *praesto*, and the like are superfluous. "*est qui rem solvas*" becomes fully sufficient to reproduce the idea required.

My conclusion is therefore that the *habet quod det* idiom may well be an extension of the ordinary relative purpose clause,¹ which is more primitive and probably proethnic; or at least that legitimate and natural extensions of purpose expressions readily become "potential." The mechanism of this extension is in the main quite simple. Verbs of effort and intention in the active voice, and particularly in the imperative mood or in the subjunctive of will, are naturally followed by clauses that express primarily will and intention, secondarily a capacity to attain the desired or intended object. Now, when the leading verb becomes a passive expression of the attainment or existence of the means sought for—that is, when the tone of effort or intention wanes—the idea of capacity becomes predominant.

If we are ready to admit this extension of the purpose clauses under certain conditions, there is still abundant room for doubt whether such extensions should still be treated individually as sporadic and remote cases of purpose clauses, or whether they constitute a new and well-defined group with form and function distinct from the purpose clause, acting as a new independent idiom. What follows may help to decide the question. Meanwhile I shall assume the truth of the second supposition.

¹The extension of function that the infinitive of purpose passed through in most languages furnishes an illuminating parallel for the story I have here sketched as well as for the next study. Note the behavior of the adverbial infinitive in English. It began as a dative of purpose (*to writanne*) governed by the preposition "to." This use still prevails of course. However, in various surroundings the purpose idea weakened and other forces prevailed. It came to suggest destination ("*ready to work*"), result or consequence ("*he was so weak as to yield*"), character ("*he is a man to thrive in the world*"), capacity ("*easy to do*"), availability ("*not a crumb to eat*"), propriety ("*worthy to be read*"), obligation ("*there are three strokes to make*;" at least, the golfer will agree with me that this denotes obligation), necessity ("*nothing is to be done*"), and so on. The road is as long from *da bibere* to *tempus est abire* in Latin, and the extensive use of the infinitival constructions in Sanskrit would furnish an abundance of additional illustrations.

2. The sketch here given attributes the change of function to forces found within the fully developed complex sentence. It does not explain anything by reference to usages in parataxis. There are signs, however, that some independent usages exerted an influence in the process. A large proportion of the verbs of these relative clauses appear in the first person, and many of them follow expressions like *nil est, non habeo*: "I am at a loss." In both of these respects they resemble dependent "deliberative" expressions. Sentences like *nil est qui tergum tegam* (*Most.* 992), "I have no means of protection for my back;" and *neque unde auxilium expetam habeo* (*Cist.* 671), are not far from the paratactic forms, in which the *qui*- and *unde*-clauses would be taken as "questions of deliberation." Mark the use of *qui*? It is an instrumental ablative, and therefore, even where introducing simply questions of the first person, like *qui ego istuc credam tibi* (*Merc.* 627), it steeps them in a tone of (in)capability. So strong is this feeling that *qui* is found continually associating with various forms of *posse*.¹ The same may be said to some extent of *quo, qua, unde, and ubi*. When "deliberative" questions with *qui* (= *quo modo*) appear in hypotaxis, they do not necessarily abandon the tone they had before. A large proportion² of the examples of our idiom use *qui* (= "how") as a connective.

In this discussion of "deliberatives" I have assumed that independent questions like *qui ego istuc credam tibi?* should not be regarded as independent "potentials," but as deliberatives. Let me illustrate. Here are three questions expressed in the first person: (a) *quid faciam?* (b) *qui faciam?* (c) *cur faciam?* [(a) "do what?" (b) "do it, how?" (c) "why do it?" i. e., "what shall I do?" "how can I do it?" "why should I do it?"] The first would normally be answered by an imperative; the second, by a statement regarding the ways and means, i. e., by some form of *posse*; the third, by a statement regarding the ethics of the situation, i. e., by some form of *oportere*. Now, by a well-respected, but, as I think, a dangerous, rule, the mood of a question

¹ Cf. *Epid.* 414; *M. G.* 1277; *Most.* 643; *Poen.* 986, 1156; *Ps.* 930; *Rud.* 1110; *Trin.* 87, 1145; and many others.

² *As.* 419; *Capl.* 581, 937; *Epid.* 384; *Men.* 304, 636; *M. G.* 768; *Most.* 992; *Rud.* 338, 393; *St.* 376; *Trin.* 14, 129, 135, 335, 336, 561, 354, 653.

is classed according to the nature of the answer. By this rule, the first question becomes a "volitive," the second a "potential," the third a "prescriptive." Is this not reading too much into the mood of *faciam*? To me the verb seems in each case to stand in the subjunctive of "deliberation." In (b) the *qui*, "how," raises an additional question of means, and in (c) the *cur*, "why," raises an additional question of propriety. It is the *qui* and the *cur* that call for *potest* and *oportet*. *faciam* is innocent.

One more point needs emphasis. Even in such combinations as *neque unde auxilium expetam habeo* it must not be thought that the entire feeling of incapacity comes from the questioning part (*unde expetam*?). The question, to be sure, is originally asked in a tone of helplessness, and therefore implies lack of means; but the new element in the complex sentence, *non habeo*, plainly asserts what the question only implied. The whole expression is now one of incapacity, and it is unfair to say that the mood of the verb or the original question is the part that conveys the meaning. Even had these not performed the function, the new combination¹ could hardly have escaped doing so. As for the mood of the verb, in such cases it is to be explained as continuing into hypotaxis the mood of the original question; and that, as we have just indicated, is the same as that of other questions in the first person, like *quid faciam*?

3. There are some independent constructions in Latin, like *quis putet? vix crederes*, that express various ideas of capacity. Now, obviously our idiom would find its simplest explanation if, when we had resolved these into their paratactic elements, the dependent clause proved to be an ordinary independent usage of the subjunctive. I shall postpone the larger problem of a possible descent

¹ It is impossible, of course, to draw the line where such dependent clauses cease to be reminiscent of the interrogative stage and begin to associate with other relative clauses. At such a time the two classes here discussed (the descendants of relative purpose clauses, and those of questions) must have fused. The *quod* expression in *non habeo quod* must have come from the former source, for it acquires its subordinating function from the *qui*-clauses, and yet the early writers were confusing relatives and interrogatives to an extent that made fusion easy. Plautus may write: *scit quod velit* (*Cist.* 706), and Cato: *quid volet faciat* (*R. R.* 148). The persisting forms *quid lubet* and *quidvis* are witnesses, too. In *Poen.* 627, *viam nescio qua veniat ad mare*, a relative pronoun referring to *viam* serves to introduce a quoted "deliberation." The testimony is abundant.

from a proethnic "potential" to the third part of this paper, and here briefly indicate why I did not simply connect (*non*) *habet quod det* with such independent expressions of capacity as exist in Latin. Such certainly exist. I find it impossible with Elmer¹ to annihilate them by translation. On the other hand, I am not fully convinced by Hale's² presentation that the verb in such expressions stands in the "potential" subjunctive. I mean that the expressions as a whole convey this peculiar force, not the mood of the verb alone. Mr. Hale recognizes some eleven³ distinct usages of this construction in Latin, and connects them with similar expressions in Greek as representatives of an Indo-European usage of the optative.

This is not the place to discuss these in full. I can only indicate by one illustration the reasons for my skepticism. The method I shall apply to the Greek examples will hold in general for the Latin as well. Let us, then, examine the potential expression with *vix* and *facile*. These adverbs obviously have no place except in expressions of capacity. We speak of "difficulty" and "ease" only with reference to the capacity to act. So true is this that in Cicero⁴ about one-half of the occurrences of these adverbs modify the verb *posse*, and the rest contain an implication of the idea that belongs to *posse*, whatever the verb or the mood of that verb may be. English says almost invariably: "he *could hardly* do it." Now, be the mood of the verb what it may, if *vix* or *facile* be present, the verb, since the verb is the part that expresses the action of the sentence, will seem imbued with the potential idea. If the verb is, e. g., a characterizing subjunctive, as in *Caes. B. G. 1. 6. 1*, "erant omnino itinera duo quibus itineribus domo exire possent; unum per Sequanos, angustum et difficile, *vix qua* singuli carri *ducerentur*," it seems natural to call it a "potential" subjunctive. By the same token, one would find a "potential" clause of fear in "metuo ne *vix* sibi *constet*," "they can hardly be consistent" (*Acad.* 132); a potential result clause in "tempetates coortae sunt maximae ut non modo proficisci non posset sed

¹ *Cornell Studies* VI.

² *Trans. A. P. A.* 1900.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 155-60. The statement in the Hale-Buck *Grammar*, sec. 516, is more conservative.

⁴ Note, too, the regular presence of *posse* in purpose clauses with *quo facilius* whereas it seldom is found with *quo maturius*, *quo libentius*, etc.

vix in oppido *consisteret*," "they could hardly hold the port" (*Verr.* i. 46); a "potential" imperfect indicative in "*vix* risum *tenebant*," "they could hardly restrain their laughter" (*Vat.* 20); and so on through the moods and tenses. Is it not true that in such cases the moods and tenses have their *raison d'être* regardless of the "potential" tone, and that this is only an adumbration of *vix* and the general tone of the sentence?

The potential idea, then, seems to belong to the whole expression,¹ and has in no case become associated with the mood of the verb and that alone. This is clear from the fact that the verb when standing alone in the subjunctive is never interpreted in the potential sense. A *vix*, *forsitan*, *facile*, or a peculiar antecedent sentence must be near by. We therefore have no independent "potential" usage of the subjunctive to form the nucleus of our complex phrase. At best we should have to assume as nucleus some stereotyped expression the combined parts of which might perform the function. However, the processes of subordination do not employ such methods, and obviously that is not the constitution of this idiom.

On the other hand, we must admit that we cannot entirely disprove the older hypothesis. It may be that at some time the mood alone without any accessories could do service as a potential expression, and that the usage finally withered away into a few phrases as they appear in historical times. We can only say that the process sketched in the foregoing seems more in conformity with the behavior of modal usages as we know them.

III. We now come to our third task; i. e., to find what light a comparative study may throw upon the provenance and history of this construction.

¹ I have not space to analyze every Latin idiom in order to prove the truth of this. The analysis of the Greek idioms will suffice for the Latin ones, since they are of the same nature. The general principle underlying the statement made above has been expressed by Morris *Aims and Methods*, pp. 96 ff., in a better manner than I find myself able to do.

As for *quis putet*, I would suggest that it was given its function and kept alive by force of *quis est qui putet*. The shorter phrase may have begun as a hypothetical expression, but in Classical Latin it is usually neither hypothetical nor purely potential in tone. It is rather a brief equivalent of *quis est qui putet*, which expresses actuality as all normal consecutive clauses do.

1. There are in Greek several sentences like *ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐκέτ' ἔστιν εἰς ὃ τι βλέπω πλὴν σοῦ* (Soph. *Ai.* 514) which closely resemble our idiom, although they are rarer. These have fortunately received a convincing discussion by Mr. Hale (*Tr. A. P. A.* 1893, pp. 156–205), who has shown beyond a doubt that they are extensions of the so-called “deliberative” usage. The existence of the many modal distinctions through the presence of *ἄν*, and the preservation of the optative, insures the possibility of greater certainty for Greek in such discussion. This proof therefore has no little weight in adding assurance to our assumption of a similar history for the Latin construction.

2. The closest Greek parallels, however, are found in the optative; and these are very similar to our idiom both in form and in function. There are several Homeric examples of this usage, like *Od.* v. 142:

*οὐ γάρ μοι πάρα νῆες ἐπήρετμοι καὶ ἑταῖροι
οἳ κέν μιν πέμποιν ἐπ' εὐρέα νῶτα θαλάσσης.*

There are also several instances without *ἄν* (cf. *Tr. A. P. A.* 1893, pp. 158 ff.), but these are too problematical to afford safe ground for inferences. Now, the first question that demands an answer is whether these Greek examples are representatives of a Greek idiom with a “pure potential;” if so, are we to connect these with our Latin idiom? To answer the first part of this question, we must be sure that Greek possesses such a usage in independent sentences. Mr. Elmer doubts it. He says: “I strongly suspect that the potential optative in Greek rests upon the same footing as the potential subjunctive in Latin, so far as the ideas of ‘may’ and ‘can’ are concerned, etc.” He proposes that they be tested in the same manner as he has tested the Latin idioms. Hale undertakes a refutation of Elmer’s arguments in *Tr. A. P. A.* 1900, pp. 138–62; and Postgate in a review of Elmer (*Class. Rev.* 1899, p. 68) says in opposition to Elmer: “The Latin potential does not stand alone. It has the support of Greek.” Now, I must confess that I “suspect” this usage of the optative in Greek as “strongly” as does Mr. Elmer, although I should not “test them in the same manner” as he, by means of translations. Such

idioms must rather be examined one by one as Greek and Latin idioms, not in arbitrary groups determined by the accidental existence of potential auxiliaries like "could," "might," "may," *können*, *mögen*, that differ in connotation in the different languages.

Here, as in the case of the Latin idiom, I shall admit at once that the expression as a whole is "potential"¹ in meaning, and that in translation we usually bring out this meaning through a "potential" verb; for it is the verb that is most often called upon to express the action of the sentence. In making this admission, however, we have not said that the verb of the original was in the *optative mood* because of the presence of such meaning.

The expressions of this nature that are most often produced as evidence are of the following types:

a) *Od.* i. 65, *πὼς ἂν ἔπειτ' Ὀδυσῆος ἐγὼ θείοιο λαθοίμην*; "How could I possibly forget the princely Odysseus?"

b) *Od.* iii. 114, *τίς κεν ἐκείνα πάντα γε μυθήσαιο*; "Who could recount all those woes?"

c) *Od.* iv. 78, *ἦ τοι Ζηνὶ βροτῶν οὐκ ἂν τις ἐρίζοι*, "No mortal man could vie with Zeus."

d) Various expressions in the affirmative that will be illustrated later.

Let us examine these in turn.

a) *πὼς* as an instrumental particle naturally teems with suggestions² of means, capacity, potency. Whatever the mood of the verb that follows, it will be pretty sure to suggest "potentiality"

¹When I speak of "potential" here, I refer of course only to the narrower sense of the word, as did Messrs. Hale, Elmer, and Bennett in their discussions. If I am right in my conviction that the subjunctive or optative *per se* never expresses this idea, we shall have to revise our terminology again; we must either restore the word "potential" to cover the "hypothetical" usages, or we may banish the word as applied to moods and speak only of "potential idioms," "potential expressions," but not "potential optatives."

²I shall have much to say of the "influence of the introductory particles and conjunctions." I do not mean to say that it is the conjunction that gives the peculiar meaning to its clause in any abiding sense. The opposite is true, of course. The clause originally shapes the function of the connective, and even changes that function freely—may in fact instil into the particles contradictory functions. However, when a conjunction has once gained a definite meaning, it may contain the kernel of the sentence-force, and thus at times perform much of the work of other parts of the sentence, even relieving the lexical and modal meanings of the verb of part of their work. Cf. questions like *quidni?* *τί μήν*; *qui dum?* where no verbal forms are needed and the lexical meaning is supplied from the context.

somewhere, unless such suggestion is overwhelmed by strong emphasis upon some other idea. Note the behavior of *πῶς*-questions in Homer. There are three types: (1) the *πῶς*-question serves as apodosis of a "contrary to fact" condition or to a statement of cause; (2) the condition lies in a phrase or word; (3) the condition is of universal content. [(1) How do it, *since*, or, *if*—? (2) How do it, *under such conditions*? (3) How do *such a thing*—*ever*?]. Note that a condition offering obvious difficulties is always expressed or implied. In fact, it is the difficulty of the condition that calls for the question of possibility or impossibility. The examples of these types in Homer are:

(1) *Il.* xvii. 149. *πῶς κε σὺ χείρονα φῶτα σαώσεις . . . | ἐπεὶ Σαρπηδὸν' ἄμα ξείνον καὶ ἑταῖρον κάλλιπες*; "How could you save a lesser man, | when you deserted Sarpedon?" Also *Od.* viii. 352; ix. 351.

(2) *Od.* xviii. 31. *πῶς δ' ἂν σὺ νεωτέρῳ ἀνδρὶ μάχοιο*; "How could you fight one younger than yourself?" Also *Il.* xvii. 325; xix. 81.

(3) *Od.* i. 65. *πῶς ἂν ἔπειτ' Ὀδυσῆος λαβοίμην*; "How could I ever forget him?" Also *Il.* x. 243; ix. 437.

The sentences teem with suggestions of impossibility, but the "potential" mechanism does not lie in the mood of the verb. It lies in *πῶς*, in the nature of the condition, in the order of the words, in the sentence stress, in particles like *ἔπειτα*, *γάρ*, *γε*, that lie scattered about to prod the reader's memory of these things. The very architecture of the phrases does its part. Mark how the tone of improbability rises with each syllable in *πῶς ἂν ἐγώ σε δέοιμι*; *Od.* viii. 352. What, then, is the function of the optative in such questions? Since impossible situations are naturally expressed by the mood of an "ideal" condition, the optative is the mood that most frequently occurs with such questions. The verb simply stands in the mood of hypothetical expressions. In fact, similar expressions with the indicative and subjunctive, though these are naturally rarer for the reason I have just given, may readily convey a potential idea, if the rest of the mechanism is present. Note the effect of *πῶς* with a dubitative subjunctive in *Od.* xvi. 70, *πῶς γὰρ δὴ τὸν ξείνον ἐγὼν ὑποδέξομαι οἴκῳ*; (Palmer translates: "*How can* I take a stranger home?") and with an indicative in *Od.* xix. 325, *πῶς γὰρ ἐμεῦ σύ, ξεῖνε, δαήσεται, εἰ . . .*

(*Il.* i. 150), "How could you think me better than other women—if you should sit unkempt at table?" Such cases are familiar enough throughout Greek, yet no one has offered to supply an intricate classification of "potential future indicatives," "potential dubitative subjunctives," and the like.¹

Sanskrit shows even fewer examples than Greek of independent expressions that might be styled "pure potentials." However, *kathā* (*katham*), the cognate and functional equivalent of *πῶς*, is prone to impregnate its clauses with this meaning, be they in whatsoever mood. See its behavior with the optative in the frequently occurring question, *kathā dāṣemāgnāye?* "How might we honor Agni?" *R.V.* i. 77. 1; iv. 5. 1; iv. 41. 13, etc. (cf. *Grass. Lex.*, *sub voce* for examples). But the subjunctive with *kathā* is quite as "potential." *kathó nū te pári carāni*, *R.V.* v. 29. 13, "How can I comprehend thy deeds?" Cf. also v. 41. 11. The instrumental *kena* behaves similarly with the optative in i. 76. 1 and with the injunctive in i. 165. 2.

In a paper on the "Uses of the Optative in the Eddas" I have brought together some material that will illustrate my point from that later field (see p. 6). The verb in *hvi megi svá vera?* "How can that be?" (*Mork.* 97. 17), was called "potential" by Delbrück (*Paul-Braune Beitr.* XXIX, p. 206). He seems to me to be reading the meaning of *hvi* and *megi* into the mood of the verb. For other examples see the paper cited (*A.J.P.* XXVII, pp. 1–32). The optative in independent sentences is too rare in Germanics to furnish many examples of this kind in any of the dialects.

b) Want of space forbids a full treatment of the subject of this excursus. In the remainder I shall limit myself to a rapid review of the material afforded by the *Odyssey*. This poem contains several examples of the type *τίς κεν . . . μυθήσαιο*. See *Od.* iii. 114; iv. 443, 649; xii. 283; xxi. 256; xxii. 12. The

¹The semantics and morphology of the phrase *πῶς ἄν* are interesting. In Homer it usually asks the question with an implication of impossibility. In *Od.* xv. 155, there is the beginning of a transition which has been accomplished by the time of Aeschylus. The phrase introduces a wish, thus carrying *ἄν* into very strange territory. Finally, *πῶς* sloughs off the *ἄν* in this optative function, having acquired such a definite optative function in its own right that it may employ *subjunctive* forms in this old meaning. Cf. Stephanos *sub voce cit.*

conditions described in the context and in the verb itself are depicted as of such a nature that the question can be asked only in a tone of incredulity. The action is never assumed as possible. The verb is simply in the mood of unreality. A typical case is afforded by Aesch. *Cho.* 595 (of the same kind, although without *ἄν*):

ἀλλ' ὑπέρτολμον ἀνδρὸς φρόνημα τίς λέγει
καὶ γυναικῶν φρεσὶ τλημόνων
παντόλμους ἔρωτας
ἄταισι συννόμους βροτῶν;

“Who could tell of the overbold purpose of man, or the all-daring infatuation of wretched woman?”

The verb might have been in an infinitive form. There are some things one knows to be impossible “once he has come to Forty Years.”

c) The above given questions are in an affirmative form with a negative implication. At times a less rhetorical form is employed; i. e., a simple negative statement; but the conditions are still of the same nature, and the verb is put in the mood of unreality to suit the situation. The occurrences in the *Odyssey* are iv. 78, “No mortal man would (might) vie with Zeus;” iii. 112; ix. 242; xii. 77, 88, 107; xiii. 87; xx. 392. Such statements are found throughout Greek. As for Sanskrit, I believe the *Rigveda* will fail to produce any examples, and in the remaining early writings they will be found very rarely if at all.

d) These negative statements and questions implying a negation constitute the greater mass of sentences that might be called upon to support a theory of a “pure potential” optative in Greek. There are also a few occurrences in the affirmative in which the expression as a whole produces a similar effect. Several of these are of the *vix facile* type which has already been discussed. What was then said will also hold for these. In *Od.* vi. 300, *ῥεῖα δ' ἀρίγνωτ' ἐστί, καὶ ἂν πᾶσις ἡγήσαιο νήπιος*, “It can easily be recognized, even a small boy might guide you to it,” both clauses convey a tone of capacity; the optative *ἡγήσαιο* no more deserves the name of “pure potential” than does the indicative *ἐστί*. In the first part *ῥεῖα* (= *facile*) and the nature of the

adjective produce the meaning; in the second part the phrase *καὶ πᾶς νήπιος* expresses quite as unmistakably as does *ρέϊα* the ease of the task. *ἡγήσαιο* is in the mood of an "ideal" apodosis. *ρέϊα* gives the same potential cast to an "irrealis" in xxiii. 188; *ρήιδίως* in xiv. 197; *αἶψα* in xiii. 147, and xvii. 561, though in less marked degree; *ἤμενος* in iv. 595; and the phrase *καὶ εἰς ἀνὴρ* in xxii. 138.

I would also call attention to some of the verbs thus affected. They are often verbs expressing such ideas as "reaching," "completely attaining to," etc. Cf. *οὐ δέ κεν εἰσαφίκοιτο*, xii. 84; *οὐ δέ κεν ἀμβαίη*, xii. 77; and the sentence often quoted as an example of the potential, *καὶ κεν διοῖστέυσεις*, xii. 102, "he might reach it with an arrow." That is, the effort implied in the *διά*, *εἰς*, *ἀνά* colors the whole expression into one of capacity, while the compound verb practically serves as an apodosis to a condition of which the verb in simple form would be the predicate, thus *εἰ διοῖστέυσεις*, *διοῖστέυσεϊς κεν*.

Is it not clear that such "pure potentials" are accidents of context? Of course, it may be that the accidents are frequent enough in a given language to establish a permanent habit or habits; i. e., to create various "potential" idioms. I doubt whether any of those discussed above can be so considered without doing violence to the spirit of the language. In fact, I fear that we have already done such violence in merely grouping these examples together, for such grouping may imply that in Greek usage these examples stood apart from the crowd of ephemeral phrases in a more peculiar and abiding manner than they actually did. There is a later potential idiom not yet mentioned—for it is post-Homeric—that seems so to have stood apart. I speak of the frequently occurring *τάχ' ἄν τις εἴποι* type. This, however, gained its independence at a relatively late date, coming into being with a peculiar semantic change in the word *τάχα* [= "quickly > readily > readily (say) > (say) perhaps"]. It appears after Homer and Hesiod, sprouts up and thrives of its own free will, and betrays no connection with a supposed proethnic "pure potential."

In early Sanskrit I have found no certain instances of an inde-

pendent optative with this meaning. In fact, then, the potential optative is pretty closely confined to the expression of "ideality" in dependent clauses. I suspect that it came into being in that field. The facts of Germanics intimate as much.¹

We must now come back to the complex sentence for which we were vainly seeking a simple base. The examples in Homer are:

Od. iv. 167, οὐ δέ οἱ ἄλλοι εἴσ', οἳ κεν κατὰ δῆμον ἀλάλκοιεν κακότητα (cf. *Il.* xxii. 348).

Od. iv. 560, οὐ γάρ οἱ πάρα νῆες ἐπήρετμοι καὶ ἐταῖροι οἳ κέν μιν πέμπουσιν ἐπ' εὐρέα νῶτα θαλάσσης (cf. *Od.* v. 142; xvii. 146; ix. 126).

Il. v. 192, ἵπποι δ' οὐ παρέασι καὶ ἄρματα, τῶν κ' ἐπιβαίην; cf. xiv. 299; v. 483, οὐ τί μοι ἐνθάδε τοῖον οἶόν κ' ἦ ἐφύροιεν Ἀχαιοὶ ἢ κεν ἄγοιεν.

I find only one example of this type in Homer with an antecedent in the affirmative. The sentence is quite loosely constructed:

Il. x. 171, εἰσὶν μὲν μοι παῖδες ἀμύμονες, εἰσὶ δὲ λαοὶ καὶ πολέες, τῶν κέν τις ἐποιχόμενος καλέσειεν.

A longer list of examples from Greek tragedy may be found in Mr. Hale's discussion of "Deliberatives" (*Tr. A. P. A.* 1893, pp. 192, 193), in which paper reference is made to these Homeric examples. The usage is found throughout Greek literature and shows such a fixed and withal peculiar form that it may fairly be treated as idiomatic. An explicit antecedent of the relative is more regularly given than in the corresponding Latin idiom, where simply (*non*) *est* or (*non*) *habet* is quite sufficient. It is also quite regularly a negative, whereas in Latin the affirmative is as frequent as the negative.

Now, if Greek possessed a "pure potential" optative in independent usage in affirmative and negative, and if this were the base of our complex sentence, it would be strange if the dependent form should thus limit itself to the negative. The fact is, as we have seen, that Greek has no such independent usage of the optative mood. In the idioms discussed above (even granting that any of them deserves the name of idiom) there is no type that could serve as a simple base for this complex usage. Much less did they form a compound of similar idioms from which a "potential" *Modusbegriff* could have emanated to create the

¹ See "The Uses of the Optative in the Eddas," *A. J. P.* XXVII, p. 11.

inspiration of a complex potential idiom. This idiom must therefore tell its own history.

I should interpret these sentences as they were formerly interpreted, before the new names were invented. The verbs are in the mood of the "irrealis." The implication of (im)possibility and (in)capacity comes from the denial of possible or capable means or agents in the antecedent phrase οὐ παρέασι, οὐ μοι ἐστίν. The psychology¹ is the same as of the simpler types already discussed. In fact, the mood of the dependent clause matters little, except that indicatives are usually too much impregnated with a precise and matter-of-fact tone to permit of such contamination; and yet this same tone betrays itself frequently even with the indicative, if the same mechanism is present. See the following, together with Jebb's (unprejudiced) translation:

οὐ γάρ τις ὁρμος ἐστίν οὐδ' ὅποι πλέων ἐξεμπολήσει κέρδος ἢ ξενώσεται. *Soph. Phil.* 303; "There is no seaport where he *can find* a gainful market or a kindly welcome."

οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπως πόλιν κείνην ἐρείψεις, *O. C.* 1373; "Never canst thou overthrow that city." Cf. also *Pl. Apol.* 37 c, and *Soph. El.* 1480.

Delbrück in his *Altindische Syntax* says under the title "Der Optative in Relativsätzen," p. 339: "Ist dagegen der Hauptsatz *fragend* oder *negativ*, so kommt in die Annahme der Nebensinn der *Unwirklichkeit*. Solche Sätze sind: *té hocur: ná vái sá manushyèshv agnér yajñtyā tanūr asti yáyeshṭvāsmākam ékaḥ syád iti* sie sprechen: unter den Menschen ist die opfermässige Gestalt des Agni nicht vorhanden, mit der opfernd man einer von uns werden könnte, Ç, B, 11, 5, 1, 13. Cf. *ibid.* 12, 3. 3. 5." This goes to the point exactly. It tells the whole story in brief. For some reason the early writers of India did not often employ such phraseology. I cannot find a good instance of it in the *Rigveda*.

These are the reasons for my "strong suspicions" of any "may-," "can-," "might-," etc., "potential" in Greek and Sanskrit. To summarize: The so-called "potential" usages of the optative in independent sentences are accidents of context, hardly reach

¹ It was the very same force that created the idiom οὐκ ἔστιν = non potest + infinitive. It first denies the existence of means; this results in an implication of incapacity and impossibility.

the dignity of idioms, do not show traces of proethnic provenance, do not combine to create a "potential" *Grundbegriff*, and reveal little power to create a more complex potential usage. The complex optative idiom that most resembles the Latin idiom under discussion is itself an isolated growth and itself an accident of context, though perhaps possessing a longer individual history than any of the independent usages canvassed. Its potential meaning belongs to its hypotactic stage, a fact which probably precludes¹ its connection with the Latin idiom.

Such is the status of the "potential" modal expressions in the cognate languages. We have found no ground in them for the assumption of a common "potential" usage of the optative from which to derive the construction (*non*) *habet quod det*. Greek has, however, offered some suggestions by way of parallel growths. It has two idioms that seem to be quite well established, though far less extensively than the Latin one. One is in the subjunctive, occurs in both affirmative and negative as does the Latin one, and seems to be an extension of the so-called "deliberative" idiom. This close parallel therefore adds likelihood to our sketch of a similar history for the Latin construction. Greek has a second idiom which is in the optative, usually with *ἄν* and regularly after a negative. This proves to be in the mood of hypothetical expressions. The existence of such an idiom suggests that our idiom may also have some close connection with the subjunctive of ideality in Latin. Such connection would be likely enough, but I see no way of proving or disproving the assumption. Greek offers no suggestions regarding a possible connection with pur-

¹This is an important point, for it discloses the limitations of comparative modal syntax. It may be safe with Delbrück to assume Indo-European modal usages in simple sentences; but as soon as one attempts to do so with the great mass of complex sentences, one is floundering in quicksands. Some of the simpler connectives seem to be proethnic. At least, Greek and Sanskrit are not so far apart in the matter of the relative pronoun. Yet who shall affirm that even Greek and Sanskrit did not independently develop their relatives from anaphoric pronouns? As for Greek and Latin, the danger is even greater. It is hard to compare constructions after relative pronouns which are of such extremely different types as *ὅς* and *qui*. It may be, of course, that they once possessed the same relative pronoun, and that Latin gradually surrendered its anaphoric relative in favor of the interrogative-indefinite; but in making so radical a change it is more than likely that the whole set of relative constructions underwent a complete change.

pose clauses. In fact, the relative purpose clauses in Greek betray such inconstancy in modal usage that one hardly expects them to affect other constructions seriously.

We may now summarize very briefly the sketch we have attempted to make. We have found that this complex idiom (*non habet quod det*) employed in potential expressions of a limited nature consists of a collocation of words which, taken at face-value, as we know such values in the historical period, is hardly conceivable. It is therefore an idiom adapted from some other construction to do service as a potential expression. The independent "potential" usages in Latin proved to be functions, not of the mood alone, but of the whole expression, and therefore could not have provided the simple basis of the complex idiom. The various potential idioms of the other languages were such as to preclude the assumption of a common Indo-European potential usage of the subjunctive or optative. It was therefore necessary to seek for the creating forces of our idiom within Latin.

We found that in form the idiom was often identical with relative clauses of purpose, and that in such clauses emphasis upon the expression of means or instrument in the antecedent created a potential idea in the dependent clause, thus tending to make the whole expression one of capacity. We also found many examples that bore the stamp of being compounded from the subjunctive questions of the first person. Furthermore, Greek provided a good parallel for this.

Even in Early Latin all of these expressions showed marked similarities, seeming to constitute a homogeneous group, and with but minor changes, continued throughout Latin, to perform the same function.

The study has also suggested some general conclusions regarding the proper criteria for assuming relationships, the validity of reference to paratactic usage, and the applicability of the comparative method; but the discussion of these must be postponed to the end of the next study, which will furnish additional, and perhaps more tangible, results.